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DENIAL OF THE CRIME AND THE AVAILABILITY OF THE
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Entrapment occurs when an agent of the government induces a person to
commit a crime, not previously contemplated by that person, for the purpose of
instituting a criminal prosecution.' The Supreme Court first recognized the en-
trapment defense in SarreIls v. United States. 2 In SarreIls, the defendant had been
convicted of selling liquor to a federal prohibition agent.' The agent, posing as
a tourist, had discussed war experiences with the defendant. 4 After twice refus-
ing the agent's requests for liquor, the defendant finally acquired some liquor
and sold it to the agent.' At trial, the defendant argued that he had been en-
trapped into doing so. 6 The trial court, however, had refused to allow the
defendant to rely on an entrapment defense.' The Supreme Court, in an opin-
ion by Chief Justice Hughes, reversed.° The Court held that as a matter of
statutory construction, Congress could not have intended that its laws be ap-
plied where the government instigates criminal acts by "persons otherwise in-
nocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish them." 9 The
Hughes opinion was construed to focus on the defendant's predisposition to
commit the crime.'° A concurring opinion asserted that the Court should have
reached its decision on a different ground by finding that the government acted
improperly in instigating a crime." The opinion notes that the Court should be
concerned with whether the government instigated the crime because, as a
matter of public policy, courts should not try crimes instigated by the govern-
ment. 12 Although the Supreme Court has continued to be divided over the prop-
er basis for the entrapment defense," the majority still endorses the Hughes
' See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 428-29 (1973).
287 U.S. 435 (1932).
3 Id. at 438.
' Id. at 439.
Id.
6 Id. at 438.
Id.
e Id, at 452.
9 Id. at 448.
" United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 (1973).
" Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459.
2 Id.
Compare Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488 (1976) (plurality opinion) and
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 428.30 (1973) (majority opinion) with Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) and United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436-39 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) and id. at 439-45 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
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opinion." Thus, the question of entrapment concerns whether a government
agent "actually implant[ed] the criminal design in the mind of the
defendant ." ' 5
 The entrapment inquiry focuses upon the defendant's
predisposition to commit the crime,'s and a finding of predisposition will
preclude a successful entrapment defense." The Supreme Court continues to
hold that entrapment is a statutory defense focusing on the defendant's
predisposition's and not a constitutional doctrine forbidding improper and
overzealous law enforcement practicesis
Even though the Supreme Court consistently has endorsed the same basis
for the entrapment defense, focusing on the defendant's predisposition, confu-
sion has arisen from the lower federal courts applying the entrapment defense
inconsistently." One area of confusion concerns whether a defendant's right to
have the issue of entrapment submitted to the jury 2 ' is affected by the presence
or absence of his admission or denial of the crime charged. 22 Because the issue
has never been addressed by the Supreme Court," the circuit courts have been
free to take varying positions.
It is often difficult to discern a sense of direction within or among the cir-
cuits in resolving this issue. Nevertheless, this note will attempt to identify four
distinct positions taken by the circuit courts. At one extreme, some courts re-
quire the defendant to admit affirmatively the crime charged before asserting
" See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488 (1976).
" United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973).
" Id. at 433.
" Id. at 436.
The Court, however, has suggested a modification of the majority opinion in which
the defendant's predisposition would be irrelevant. In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423
(1973), the Court noted the possibility that the conduct of -a government agent might be "so
outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking the
judicial processes to obtain a conviction . . . ." Id. ar431-32. This modification was rejected in
the plurality opinion in HamptOn v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1976) (opinion by
Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and White, J.). This position, however, was left open in a
concurring opinion, Id. at 492-95 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun, J.), and endorsed
in a dissenting opinion, Id. at 497-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart and Marshall,
" Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488; Russell, 411 U.S. at 433.
" Russell, 411 U.S. at 433.
25 See Orfield, The Defense of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1967 DUKE L.J. 39, 43-71;
Milkell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 247-52 (1942).
21 Throughout this note, it will be assumed that this issue only arises when there is suffi-
cient evidence in the record indicating entrapment. In the absence of such evidence, the issue
should not be submitted to the jury irrespective of the defendant's denial or admission. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 1301, 1303 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Licursi, 525 F.2d.
1164, 1169 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Alford, 373 F.2d 508, 509 (2d Cir. 1967); Crisp
v. United States, 262 F.2d 68, 69 (4th Cir. 1958).
22
 Perhaps this issue would not arise if the Court adopted the minority's "objective"
view. Thus, if the entrapment defense only concerned the nature of the government's actions and
whether they were improper, the presence or nature of the defendant's testimony would not be
relevant.
" United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1172 (2d Cir. 1980).
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that he was entrapped. Other courts take a slightly different view. Although
they do not require a defendant claiming entrapment to admit the crime, they
do insist that he refrain from denying the crime. At the other extreme, a third
group of courts has allowed a defendant to deny all aspects of the crime and still
utilize an entrapment defense. Finally, at least one circuit court allows the
defendant claiming entrapment to introduce testimony that is not too inconsis-
tent with the entrapment defense. This note will examine the origin of and the
reasoning behind each of these four positions. It will be shown that the various
approaches of the circuit courts address concerns such as maintaining the pur-
pose of a criminal trial as a search for the truth and providing adequate protec-
tion to a criminal defendant. A search for truth might be hindered by permit-
ting a defendant to testify inconsistently with a defense he advances. In addi-
tion, restricting a defendant's testimony so that he may argue entrapment
might unduly withdraw protections that should be accorded a criminal defend-
ant. It will be argued, however, that none of the four circuit court positions
provides the proper balance between those concerns. Following a review of the
four positions, therefore, a new rule will be proposed that seeks to achieve a
better balance.
I. THE APPROACHES OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
A. Admitting the crime as a prerequisite to the entrapment defense
("defendant must admit all" rule)
Several courts have asserted that a defendant is not entitled to raise an en-
trapment defense unless he admits" commission of the crime charged. These
courts reason that because entrapment can occur only when a crime has been
committed, the defendant must admit the crime before he should be permitted
to raise an entrapment defense. Although currently only the Third and Seventh
circuits endorse the "defendant must admit all" rule, at one time, the Ninth
and Tenth circuits did also."
The Tenth Circuit originally endorsed the "defendant must admit all"
24 These courts have not defined what will be sufficient as an admission of the crime.
See, e.g. , United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Johnston, 426
F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1970); Martinez v. United States, 373 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1967); Ortega v.
United States, 348 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1965). Thus, it is unclear whether an affidavit will suffice.
One court has held that defense counsel's opening and closing arguments claiming that the
defendant had admitted the crime were not sufficient where the defendant's testimony indicated
otherwise. United States v. Hendricks, 456 F.2d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 1972). In cases where the
defendant has testified, it is appropriate that the question of whether the defendant has admitted
the crime should be answered on the basis of his testimony.
25 See United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 964 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Johnston, 426 F.2d 112, 114 (7th Cir. 1970); Demma v. United States, 523 F.2d 981, 982 (9th
Cir. 1975) (overruling Eastman v. United States, 212 F.2d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1954)); United
States v. Worth, 505 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975) (limiting
Martinez v. United States, 373 F.2d 810, 811-12 (lbth Cir. 1967)).
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rule in Martinez v. United States. 26 In Martinez, the defendant was convicted of il-
legal possession of marijuana despite the protestations of the defendant that he
had been entrapped." At trial, the defendant was permitted to have the jury
instructed on entrapment and the sole question on appeal was whether the trial
court's instructions were adequate. 28
 In the course of its decision, the Tenth
Circuit commented on the availability of the entrapment defense. 29 The court
described the defense as an affirmative defense requiring the defendant to con-
fess the crime before he may avoid it." The court stated that the entrapment
defense could not be applicable to a case until the defendant admitted commit-
ting the crime charged. 3 '
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit at one time purported to embrace the "defend-
ant must admit all" rule." Support for the rule came from the case of Eastman
v. United States." In that case, the defendants denied the crimes of importing,
knowingly concealing, and facilitating the transportation of opium. 34 They also
argued that they were entrapped." Nevertheless, the trial judge refused to
instruct the jury on entrapment. 36
 Upon their conviction, 37 the defendants
claimed that it was error for the district judge to have refused to instruct the
jury on entrapment." The Ninth Circuit, however, affirmed the decision of the
court below. 39 The Ninth Circuit characterized the defendant's position —
denying the crime and at the same time claiming entrapment — as inconsistent
and noted that unless a crime has been committed, there can be no entrap-
ment." The court observed that if the defendant denied the crime, instructing
the jury on entrapment could result only in confusion.'"
26
 373 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1967). In United States v. Worth, 505 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975), the Tenth Circuit limited Martinez by holding that a
defendant need not admit the crime in order to rely on entrapment, he must only refrain from
denying the crime.
" Martinez, 373 F.2d at 811.
28 Id. The Tenth Circuit upheld the adequacy of the instructions. Id. at 813.
29
 Id. at 811-12.
'° Id. at 811.
"I Id. at 811-12. This statement, along with the court's acknowledgment that the issue
of entrapment was properly submitted, id. at 812, implies that the defendant admitted the crime.
The court never stated so explicitly.
32
 In United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975) (en Banc), however, the
Ninth Circuit overruled its line of cases adopting the "defendant must admit all" rule. Id. at 982.
See text and notes at notes 98-122 infra.
" 212 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1954).
34 Id. at 322. The court noted that the defendants "have maintained throughout that
they did not commit a crime." Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
" Id. at 321.
38 Id. at 322.
39 Id.
4° Id.
41 Id.
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The reasoning of Eastman was extended in the case of Ortega v. United
States. 42
 There, the defendant was convicted of concealing and selling heroin."
The defendant had denied sale, possession, or delivery of any narcotics.** The
defendant requested the trial judge to instruct the jury on entrapment and the
trial judge refused." The Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's refusal to sub-
mit an entrapment instruction to the jury. 46 The court noted that entrapment
could not exist without commission of a crime, and concluded that in order for
a defendant to use the entrapment defense, he must admit committing the
crime.'" Thus, although Eastman found it inconsistent for a defendant to claim
entrapment and simultaneously to deny the crime, Ortega went further and
stated that a defendant must affirmatively admit the crime in order to pursue
an entrapment defense.
The courts embracing the "defendant must admit all" rule are correct in
noting that the nature of the entrapment defense dictates that the fact finder
first must determine that a crime was committed before considering whether
the defendant was lured into committing a crime he was not predisposed to
commit. They supply, however, no rationale as to why the defendant must
make the fact finder's determination that the defendant committed the crime
charged a foregone conclusion by requiring the defendant to admit the crime.
The courts appear to be reacting to the inconsistency between a defendant's ac-
tive denial of criminal involvement and his desire to claim entrapment as to
acts he denied. It is important to note, however, that inconsistency arises only
between a claim of entrapment and the denial of the crime, not between an en-
trapment claim and the absence of an admission to the crime. Nevertheless,
two circuits, the Third and Seventh, continue to require, or claim to require, a
defendant to admit to the crime before he may assert entrapment." Both these
circuits have failed to give the issue more than cursory consideration, relying
ultimately on Ninth Circuit precedent." Other courts that at one time in-
dicated that they would follow the rule either have repudiated it totally 50 or
have modified their position to preclude the entrapment defense only from
42 348 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1965).
" Id. at 875.
14 Id. at 876.
" Id. at 875 n.1.
46 Id. at 876.
" Id.
48 United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 964 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Levin,
606 F.2d 47, 48 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curium); United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir.
1973); United States v. Roviaro, 379 F.2d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 1967).
" See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir. 1973) (citing United
States v. Hendricks, 456 F.2d 167 (9th Cir. 1972)); United States v. Roviaro, 379 F.2d 911, 914
(7th Cir. 1967) (citing Ortega v. United States, 348 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1965)).
5° United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc). See text at notes
95-119 infra.
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defendants who actually deny the crime and not from defendants who merely
refrain from admitting the crime."
B. Absence of a denial of the crime as prerequisite to the entrapment defense
("defendant may not deny" rule)
The position that a defendant will not be precluded from asserting entrap-
ment provided he does not deny the crime is gaining acceptance among the cir-
cuits. 52 This position is more liberal than the "defendant must admit all" rule,
discussed above, which allows only a defendant who admitted the crime to rely
on entrapment. 53
 The "defendant may not deny" rule does not require an ad-
mission, but permits a defendant who refrains from denying the crime charged
to assert an entrapment defense. The courts embracing this rule reason that it
is an affirmative denial of the crime, not a failure to admit the crime, that is in-
consistent with a claim of entrapment." Thus, in determining whether to allow
a defendant to rely on the entrapment defense, courts accepting the "defendant
may not deny" rule focus on whether the defendant has refrained from deny-
ing the crime and not whether he has admitted the crime.
Courts have not addressed the question of what will constitute a denial.
Where the defendant has testified, it is proper that his testimony should be the
basis on which the question is decided. It seems unlikely that when a defendant
testifies a court will construe the actions of defense counsel to operate as a
denial. Where a defendant does not testify, one court has raised the question
whether using alibi witnesses will operate as a denial. 55 Indeed, that same court
held that for a defendant not taking the stand to testify, defense counsel's sum-
mary asserting that the defendant had nothing to do with the crime and defense
counsel's examination of other witnesses seeking to show that same assertion
were not sufficient to preclude an entrapment defense. 56
A recent case adopting the "defendant may not deny" rule is United States
v. Annese. 57 In that First Circuit case, the defendant's was charged with
manufacturing narcotics and conspiring to manufacture narcotics." During
the course of the trial, the district court was informed that the defendant was
5 ' United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158 (2d Cir. 1980), United States v. Annese,
631 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Worth, 505 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975); United States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d 602 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 933 (1971). See text at notes 57-72, 162-70 infra.
52 See note 51 supra.
53 See text and notes at notes 24-51 supra.
54 See, e.g., United States v. Annese, 631 F.2d 1041, 1046-47 (1st Cir. 1980); United
States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d 602, 605 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971).
55 United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1172 (2d Cir. 1980).
56 Id. at 5679.
5 ' 631 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1980).
56 Reference is made to defendant Nicholas Tavano.
59 Annese, 631 F.2d at 1042.
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not going to take the stand but intended to rely on the entrapment defense." In
considering the availability of the entrapment defense, the trial court first noted
that the law of the First Circuit precluded a defendant who took the stand and
denied the crime from relying on entrapment.° The court then stated that it
found no First Circuit case that squarely ruled on whether a defendant who
does not take the stand may claim entrapment. 62 Relying on a footnote in a
prior First Circuit case, however, the district judge ruled that the defendant
must take the stand, and presumably admit the crime, in order to be able to
claim entrapment. 63 Faced with the court's ruling, the defendant decided to
take the stand. 64 During his testimony and cross examination he admitted a
prior conviction. 65 Upon conviction, the defendant appealed the district court's
ruling. 66
The First Circuit reversed.° That court observed that all of the First Cir-
cuit cases holding that the defendant must admit the crime before claiming en-
trapment involved defendants who had taken the stand. 68 The court agreed
with these cases that it would be impermissibly. inconsistent for a defendant to
take the stand and deny involvement in any criminal acts as to which he sought
to claim entrapment. 69 The court found, however, that where there was
evidence of governmental inducement, the defendant may remain silent and
rely on entrapment. 7° Thus, the jury may determine whether the government
has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and, if so, then consider
whether the defendant was entrapped. 7 ' The court noted that although a defend-
ant's effort to show entrapment may be hampered by his failure to testify, he
had the right to make that choice."
The principal rationale behind the "defendant may not deny" rule is the
"inconsistency theory," which argues that it is logically inconsistent for a
" Id. at 1045.
61 Id.
62 Id .
63 Id. (relying on United States v. Caron, 588 F.2d 851, 852, n.4 (1st Cir. 1978)). The
defendant, by taking the stand and being subject to cross-examination, would have to either ad-
mit the crime or deny the crime. The settled law of the Second Circuit was that a defendant could
not deny the crime and claim entrapment. See id. at 1046. Thus, the defendant under the district
judge's ruling presumably must admit the crime in order to assert entrapment.
64 Id. at 1047.
65 Id. Although apparently the defendant admitted the crime, see note 63 supra, it is not
clear that this admission would be very prejudicial to the defendant as his "chief defense" was
entrapment. Id. at 1043. By taking the stand, the defendant was forced to admit to a prior convic-
tion. Id. at 1047, The defendant's admission to a prior conviction, however, is clearly prejudicial.
See id. at 1047.
66 Id. at 1042.
67 Id. at 1047.
66 Id. at 1046.
69 Id. at 1047.
7° Id.
" Id.
72 Id. Without elaboration, the court noted that its holding avoided any fifth amend-
ment questions. Id.
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defendant to claim that he was entrapped into a crime that he denies commit-
ting." Just the existence of that inconsistency, however, would not justify the
"defendant may not deny" rule. There must be a reason why that inconsisten-
cy is undesirable. The most persuasive reason why such inconsistency should
not be permitted is the possibility that it may serve only to confuse the jury un-
justifiably. 74
Whether the "defendant may not deny" rule is justified in its own right, it
is clearly preferable to the "defendant must admit all" rule. First, the "incon-
sistency theory" is well served by the "defendant may not deny" rule. It is un-
necessary to resort to the more restrictive "defendant must admit all" rule to
avoid any inconsistency. So long as the defendant does not deny the crime, no
inconsistency may arise. Second, the "defendant may not deny" rule has the
advantage of putting the government to its proof, thereby avoiding any possi-
ble claim that the defendant is required to waive his right against self in-
crimination in order to assert entrapment." Under the "defendant must admit
all" rule, if a defendant wishes to urge entrapment, then the government is
relieved of its burden of proof as to any physical acts committed and, apparent-
ly, as to any required mental element of the substantive crime." Under the
"defendant may not deny" rule, the government still has the burden of prov-
ing all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden of
proof is an important guarantee in our criminal justice system." Thus, under
the "defendant may not deny" rule, there is no relief of the government's
burden of proof and no constitutional problem with the presumption of in-
nocence . 78
Although the "defendant may not deny" rule avoids any relief of burden
of proof problems, there is a related drawback. The defendant must make a
tactical choice between either denying the crime, and thus making the govern-
ment's substantive case more difficult, or refraining from testifying, and
thereby preserving his right to argue entrapment. Requiring such a tactical
choice is, however, by no means unique to entrapment in the criminal justice
system. Criminal defendants frequently are faced with such decisions. For ex-
ample, a defendant may not complain if his testimony opens the door to cross-
" See, e.g. , United States v. Brooks, 611 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane).
" See Eastman v. United States, 212 F.2d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1954).
75
 A form of this argument was used in Demma, 523 F.2d at 983.
" Many decisions do not appear to differentiate between a denial of any physical or
mental element of a crime. See, e.g., United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 964 (3d Cir. 1979)
(the defendant must admit "that there were present the elements of the crime with which he is
charged. [footnote omitted]"); United States v. Roviaro, 379 F.2d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 1967) (the
defendant must admit to criminal acts).
77 See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 699-701 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
362-64 (1970).
78 See the discussion of Demma and its first two rationales at text at notes 108-18 infra.
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examination," including impeachment through evidence of prior crimes," or
even impeachment by illegally obtained evidence. 8 '
The "defendant may not deny" rule addresses the same crucial concerns
as the "defendant must admit all" rule with fewer objectionable results. It has
a stronger logical basis and forces the government to prove that which it should
have to prove — guilt beyond a reasonable doubt — without unwilling help
from the defendant. Thus, the "defendant may not deny" rule is an improve-
ment over the "defendant must admit all" rule.
C. The alternative defense theory ("defendant may deny all" rule)
Three circuits have taken the position that a defendant may both deny
committing the crime, and alternatively assert that he was entrapped. 82 One
court justified this position by stating that there was no inconsistency in those
two defenses. 83 A stronger rationale supporting the "defendant may deny all"
rule stresses that the defendant is entitled to require the government to prove
its entire case. 84 As noted in the previous section, if the defendant must admit
the crime to plead entrapment, then the government is relieved of the burden
of proving the substantive crime. Similarly, if the defendant must forego an en-
trapment defense in order to deny commission of the substantive crime, the
government is freed from its burden of persuasion with respect to entrapment.
Thus, some courts have concluded that requiring the defendant to choose be-
tween alternative defenses is contrary to the requirement that the government
prove every element of the crime.
One such court, the District of Columbia Circuit, explained its reasoning
for supporting the "defendant may deny all" rule in the case of Hansford v.
United States. 65 In Hansford, the defendant was convicted of illegal sale of nar-
cotics." During the trial, the defendant took the stand and denied making the
alleged sale." Despite this denial, the trial court permitted the defendant to re-
ly on an entrapment defense."
79
 Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1958).
8° Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1967).
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26 (1971); Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62, 64-66 (1954). See Groot, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I (Without Scienter) Did Ed — Denial of
Crime and the Entrapment Defense, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 254, 272.
" See United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane); Hansford v.
United States, 303 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en bane); Crisp v. United States, 262 F.2d 68,
70 (4th Cir. 1958).
83 Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en bane). See text at
notes 85-90 infra.
°' United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane). See text at
notes 98-122 infra.
" 303 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en bane).
88 Id. at 220.
87 Id.
" Id. at 221.
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On appeal the District of Columbia Circuit held that the submission of
both defenses of denial and entrapment was proper. 89 The court reasoned that
"[t]he defenses were alternative but not inconsistent. It was consistent with the
defendant's denial of the transaction to urge that if the jury believed [that the
transaction] did occur the government's evidence as to how it occurred in-
dicated entrapment." 9°
The alternative defense rationale of Hansford was obscured somewhat by
the subsequent District of Columbia Circuit case of United States v. Neuman."
The issue before the court in that case was "whether the defense of entrapment
was properly raised over [defendants'] objection," thereby allowing the
government to introduce evidence regarding the criminal predisposition of the
defendant." In Neuman, the trial court ruled that questioning of certain
witnesses by the defense had the effect of implicitly raising the entrapment
defense." The defendant was convicted and he appealed." On appeal, the cir-
cuit court recognized that Hansford established the rule permitting denial of the
crime and a claim of entrapment." In considering whether entrapment could
be raised implicitly by the defendants, the court noted that "a plea of entrap-
ment admits commission of the act charged . . . . " 96
The court's language in Neuman is confusing in light of the court's
language in Hansford. Irrespective of whether the simultaneous assertion of the
two defenses should be permitted, it is difficult to conceive how a plea that ad-
mits the crime can be consistent with a denial of the crime. Consequently,
while acknowledging the "defendant may deny all" rule, the court in Neuman
seems to have undermined the rationale of that rule as articulated in Hansford. 97
Stronger support for the "defendant may deny all" rule was supplied by
the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Denzma. 98 Demma, decided en bane, held
that a defendant may deny any or all elements of the crime charged and still be
able to claim entrapment. 99 In so holding, Demma overruled the prior Ninth
Circuit rule, which originated in Eastman v. United States.'" In Eastman, the
99 Id.
9° Id.
91
 436 F.2d 285 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
94 at 286. Defense counsel asked questions of witnesses suggestive of an entrapment
defense. Id. at 287. The court held that in such a situation, the judge should require the attorney
either to plead entrapment (thus allowing the government to present evidence on the defendant's
predisposition) or to abandon such suggestive questioning. Id.
93 Id. at 286.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 286 n.l.
96 Id. at 286 (footnote omitted).
97 Indeed, a case from another circuit criticized the reasoning in Hansford. In Ortega v.
United States, 348 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1975), the court stated that "[Merhaps it is a matter of
semantics, but we believe the defense of entrapment (i.e., 'I only did it because the government
agent induced me to do it.') is inconsistent with the defense 'I didn't do it.' " Id. at 875 (original
emphasis).
93 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane).
99 Id. at 985.
'°° 212 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1954).
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court had held that it was impermissibly inconsistent for a defendant to deny
the crime and claim entrapment simultaneously.' 01 Subsequent Ninth Circuit
cases extended the holding in Eastman to require a defendant to admit the crime
charged in order to assert entrapment. 102 The Demma court treated the
"Eastman rule" as being the "defendant must admit all" rule.'"
In Demma, the defendants were charged with conspiracy to import and
distribute heroin.'" Each defendant admitted that he agreed to import and
distribute, but they all denied any criminal intent, arguing that they believed
they were working for the government. 105 At trial, the district court refused to
permit the defendants to rely on entrapment because they had not admitted the
crime. 106
The Ninth Circuit reversed,'" however, and justified its decision on three
grounds. The court first asserted that in certain situations the Eastman rule con-
flicted with Supreme Court authority. 108 The court noted that the Eastman rule
required a defendant to admit both the physical acts of a crime and any
necessary mental element in order to claim entrapment.'" The Demma court
claimed that requiring concession of a mental element was contrary to the
Supreme Court's opinion in Sorrel's v. United States ."° The court stated that the
decision in Sorrel's dictates that "whenever the element of non-entrapment is
put in issue," the government bears the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the acts of the crime charged were non-entrapped acts."'
The Demmer court observed that this requirement of Sorrel's was violated by the
Eastman rule whenever a defendant wishing - to claim entrapment was charged
with a crime that involved a mental element which he was unwilling to con-
cede. 112 By requiring a defendant to forego an entrapment defense in order that
he might deny a mental element, the Demma court reasoned that the govern-
ment was relieved of the burden of proof as to non-entrapment." 3 The court
concluded, therefore, that the Eastman rule was incompatible with Sorrells." 4
This conflict with Sorrells was one reason why the court rejected Eastman."'
1 °' Id. at 322. See text at notes 33-40 supra.
1 °7 See, e.g. , Ortega v. United States, 348 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1965). See text at notes
42-47 supra.
'm See Demma, 523 F.2d at 984.
104
 Id. at 982.
H Id.
10.5
Io7 Id.
108 Demma, 523 F.2d at 982. Although the Demma court refers to Eastman as being in con-
flict with Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369
(1958); and United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), its discussion of the last two cases is
limited to only passing references,
1 °9 Demma, 523 F.2d at 982.
110 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
Demma, 523 F.2d at 983.
1 " Id.
'" Id.
14 Id. at 982.
" 5 Id.
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As a second reason for discarding the Eastman rule, the court stated that
the basis of the rule, the "inconsistency theory," would not support its applica-
tion where the defendant does not deny the crime. 16
 The "inconsistency
theory" provides that because a claim of entrapment applies only when a crime
has been committed, it is inconsistent for a defendant to deny the crime and to
claim entrapment simultaneously."' The Demma court found, however, no in-
consistency where a defendant refrains from testifying and argues that the
government has not met its burden of proving that the defendant committed
the crime, or, if this burden is satisfied, that the government has failed to show
adequately that the defendant was not entrapped." 8
 Thus, the court deter-
mined that it was permissible for a defendant to claim entrapment provided he
has not denied the crime.
The third basis for the Demma court's rejection of the Eastman rule was that
the "inconsistency theory" was "seriously infirm.' "19
 The court noted that in-
consistent defenses generally may be asserted in criminal trials and that there is
no justification for an exception with regard to entrapment.'" A rule permit-
ting inconsistent defenses, the court said, is supported by "the belief of modern
criminal jurisprudence that a criminal defendant should be accorded every
reasonable protection in defending himself against governmental
protection." 121
 Thus, the court concluded that even where the defendant
denies that he committed the acts with which he is charged, the entrapment
defense should not be precluded merely because it is inconsistent with
denia1. 122
The Demma court devoted a considerable portion of its opinion to justify-
ing its decision to overrule Eastman. Much of its analysis, however, does not
support the sweeping new rule that the court adopted. While the first two of its
arguments provide reasons to discard the Eastman rule, they do not provide
support for the "defendant may deny all" rule, adopted in Demma. First, even
the Ninth Circuit conceded that its Sorrel's argument, rather than supporting
the rule adopted, militated only against a rule requiring a defendant's admis-
sion of a mental element.' 23
 It did not establish the impropriety of a rule that
requires the defendant to admit physical elements of the crime. Indeed, the Sor-
rells argument would support a rule that required a defendant claiming entrap-
ment to admit any physical acts and to refrain from denying any mental ele-
ment. Moreover, the court's second argument is similarly limited. While the
court showed that the inconsistency theory does not necessitate a rule requiring
" 6 Id. at 984.
17 Id. at 982.
"8 Id. at 984.
"9
 Id. at 985.
120 Id.
122 Id.
M
122
 See text at notes 109-12 supra.
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that the defendant admit the crime, the court did not demonstrate that the
theory permits the defendant to deny the crime."'" Thus, the "inconsistency
theory" is at odds with the Demma court's broad rule permitting even a defend-
ant who actively denies the crime to assert an entrapment defense.
It is only the court's third argument that supports its rule that the entrap-
ment defense should be available even to a defendant who denies the crime.
This argument asserts that modern criminal jurisprudence dictates that a
defendant in a criminal case should be provided with every reasonable protec-
tion.' 25 Consequently, it suggests a balancing process. On one side of the
balance is the concern that our system of justice must provide sufficient protec-
tion to criminal defendants by allowing them to plead alternative defenses. On
the other side are concerns that allowing inconsistent defenses will confuse the
jury129 and subvert the search for truth.' 27 By favoring a strong protection of
criminal defendants, the "defendant may deny all" rule implicitly discounts
the second set of concerns as speculative or minimal. These concerns are,
however, of great importance to the justice system. By permitting a defendant
to claim that he was entrapped into those physical acts which he asserts he did
not do, the "defendant may not deny" rule grants the defendant a license to
commit perjury. For example, a defendant could not be telling the truth if he
claimed that he would not have given an agent narcotics except for the impor-
tuning of the agent and also claimed that he never engaged in any transaction
with the agent. In addition, the defendant is permitted to obscure the truth by
confusing the jury. Although adequate protection must be accorded to criminal
defendants, the above concerns should not be ignored.
D. Permitting the entrapment defense provided there is no testimony too
inconsistent with that defense ("testimony not too inconsistent" rule)
An alternative approach has evolved in the Fifth Circuit. The current ap-
proach of the Fifth Circuit is to allow a defendant to assert entrapment provid-
ed that his testimony is "not too inconsistent" with that defense.'" This test
attempts, in effect, to balance the various policy factors surrounding this issue
on a case by case basis and extends the "defendant may not deny" rule. This
approach is best illustrated by a review of important Fifth Circuit cases. In its
earliest cases, the Fifth Circuit declared that the defense of entrapment was
predicated on an assumption that the crime charged was committed.' 29
1 " See text at note 116 supra.
' 25 Demma, 523 F.2d at 985.
126 Sec Eastman v. United States, 212 F.2d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1954).
122 Sec Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir. 1965); Henderson v. United
States, 237 F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1956).
129 See, e.g. , United States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d 602, 605 (5th Cir.), ceri. denied, 403 U.S.
933 (1971); Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir. 1965); Henderson v. United
States, 237 F.2d 169, 172-73 (5th Cir. 1956).
129 See, e.g., Hamilton v. United States, 221 F.2d 611, 614 (5th Cir. 1955).
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Therefore, the Fifth Circuit originally addressed the inconsistent entrapment
defense issue by stating that the, defense of entrapment is "not available where
. . the defendant denies the very acts upon which the prosecution and the
defense are necessarily predicated.""°
The first thorough reconsideration of this rule of law occurred in the case
of Henderson v. United States In Henderson, the defendant was charged with
conspiracy to distill non-taxpaid whiskey.' 32 At the trial, the defendant relied
on two defenses. First, he claimed that he was entrapped into the overt acts
with which he was charged.' 33
 Second, he denied that he was a party to any
conspiracy." 4
 The trial judge refused to instruct the jury on entrapment
because he believed that the defendant's denial of the conspiracy precluded an
assertion of entrapment.'" The defendant was convicted and appealed.' 36 In
considering the case on appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the ruling of the trial
court.'" The court reasoned that "[t]he common goal of all trials . . . is to ar-
rive at the truth, and it would seem that inconsistent defenses should be permit-
ted or not permitted according to whether they might help or hinder a search
for the truth. Perhaps that may depend upon the degree of inconsistency.'' 3 B
The court noted that proof of entrapment may not be so repugnant to proof of
the defendant's innocence that proof of one necessarily disproves the other. 139
The court found the defenses in the case at bar to be sufficiently consistent to
allow the defendant to argue both of them.'" The court allowed the defendant
to claim entrapment as to the overt acts of conspiracy and still deny that he was
a party to any conspiracy."'
The next important case in the Fifth Circuit arose in circumstances similar
to those of Henderson. In Sears v. United States,' 42,
 the defendant also was indicted
for conspiracy in regard to an illegal still.'" The defendant, a sheriff, was
charged with agreeing to furnish "protection"'" for the still in exchange for a
130
 Rodriguez v. United States, 227 F.2d 912, 914 (5th Cir. 1955). This statement from
Rodriguez is either dictum or an alternate holding since the court found insufficient evidence to
raise entrapment. Id. The Fifth Circuit, however, in Marko v, United States, 314 F.2d 595,
597-98 (5th Cir. 1963), held in accord with the Rodriguez.decision and quoted the above language.
"' 237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956).
'" Id. at 170.
' 33 Id. at 173.
"4 Id.
'" Id. at 171.
16 Id. at 170.
' 37 Id. at 173.
16 Id. at 172.
"9 Id. at 173.
1•0 id.
141 Id.
"2
 343 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1965).
143
 Id. at 140.
' 4 ' The "protection" referred to was warning the informant of any law enforcement in-
vestigations. Id. at 141.
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bribe.'" At trial, certain testimony by government witnesses suggested that the
defendant may have been entrapped. For example, government agents testified
that they had hired an informant with the understanding that he would be paid
only if a conviction resulted.'" The informant testified that it was he who in-
itiated discussion about the bribe and that the defendant was reluctant at first
to accept it.'" When the defendant took the stand, however, he did not claim
he had been entrapped. Instead, he denied ever accepting money from the in-
formant and denied any knowledge of or participation in the alleged con-
spiracy.'" Nevertheless, at the end of the trial, the defendant requested an in-
struction on entrapment based on the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses.'" The district court refused to instruct the jury on entrapment. 150
The Fifth Circuit reversed."' It stated that a defendant is entitled to have
the jury instruction adjusted to the evidence.'" The Sears court reasoned that
where the government's case presents substantial evidence of entrapment, the
defendant may insist that the jury be "instructed that if they find he committed
the acts charged, they must further consider whether he was entrapped into
them." 13 The court added that by making the government establish its whole
case, the defendant should not be precluded from a possibly valid defense.'"
Thus, by allowing the defendant to claim entrapment if the government's case
introduces the issue, the Sears decision argues that a defendant should be able to
put the government to its proof. 155
Although the cases arose in factually similar circumstances, Sears and
Henderson are directed at two different situations. Henderson controls when a
defendant charged with conspiracy admits overt acts 156 and claims entrapment
as to them, but denies being a party to any conspiracy.!" In such a case,
Henderson holds that the defendant may claim entrapment with respect to the
overt acts.'" In Sears, the defendant denied the overt acts' 59 but was entitled to
1 " Id. at 140-41.
146 Id.
141 Id. at 141.
14B Id. at 143.
149 Id. at 142.
i3o
l " Id. at 143.
152 Id.
"' Id.
1B4
I " Id. at 143-44.
I " Two subsequent cases have stated that Henderson applied when the overt acts admit-
ted by the defendant are culpable acts and not merely innocent ones. United States v. O'Leary,
529 F.2d 1202, 1203 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiarn); United States v. Newcomb, 488 F.2d 190, 192
(5th Cir.) (per curiam), cm. denied, 417 U.S. 931 (1974).
I" Henderson, 237 F.2d at 173.
"8 Id.
"9 Sears, 343 F.2d at 143 (defendant's "primary defenses [were] that he never commit-
ted any of the acts charged.").
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have an entrapment instruction given to the jury since it was the government's
own evidence that introduced the issue of entrapment.' 6° Thus, the court in
Sears determined that it was not impermissibly inconsistent for the defendant to
rely on the evidence of entrapment introduced by the government. 16 '
Until 1971, the Fifth Circuit had not ruled directly on whether a defend-
ant who refrains from denying the acts charged is entitled to assert entrap-
ment.' 62 Any possible question as to the court's position on the matter was
resolved in United States v. Groessel. 163 In Groessel, the defendant was indicted for
conspiracy to transport stolen vehicles in foreign commerce.'" Sale of the
vehicles was to be made to a government agent.' 65 The defendant did not
testify and the trial court instructed the jury on entrapment.'" The defendant
was convicted and appealed to the Fifth Circuit.' 67 He claimed that, among
other errors, the trial judge's jury instructions on entrapment were incorrect
and that because the evidence of entrapment was so strong the judge should
have found entrapment as a matter of law.' 68 The government countered that
the defendant was not entitled to raise entrapment since he did not admit the
crime. 169 The Fifth Circuit held that because the defendant did not take the
stand and deny the crime charged, the defense of entrapment was available to
him. 170
The latest major development in the Fifth Circuit came in the case of
United States v. Greenfield.in In Greenfield, the defendant, a physician, was charged
with ten counts of distributing a controlled substance because he had written
ten prescriptions over a five month period to a government investigator. 12 The
defendant testified that he gave the prescriptions because he believed there was
1 " Id.
Id. It does not seem to be of any significance that Sears arose from a conspiracy
charge. Nevertheless, some subsequent courts found the importance of Sears related to the con-
spiracy charge. United States v. Pickle, 424 F.2d 528, 528 (5th Cir. 1970); McCarty v. United
States, 379 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 929 (1967); Beatty v. United States,
377 F.2d 181, 186 n.9 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 45 (1967). Several other courts,
however, have noted that Sears derives its importance from the court's determination that the
government's case injected a substantial amount of entrapment evidence. United States v.
Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978); United States v.
Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 138-39 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977); United States v,
Q'Leary, 529 F.2d 1202, 1203 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curium); United States v. Newcomb, 488 F.2d
190, 191-92 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931 (1974).
162
 The assumption that there is sufficient evidence to warrant submission of the entrap-
ment issue to the jury is continued.
163
	 F.2d 602 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971).
' 64 Id. at 604.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 605.
161 Id. at 604.
I " Id. at 605.
169 Id.
"° Id.
17 ' 554 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978).
172 Id. at 180-81.
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a legitimate medical reason for them. 13 The trial court had withheld an en-
trapment instruction because it determined that the defendant had denied the
crime.' 74 The Fifth Circuit reversed. 13
In its opinion, the circuit court stated first that "Nile rationale for the
["defendant may not deny"] rule appears to be that to deny the very acts upon
which the prosecution is predicated and at the same time plead the defense of
entrapment, which assumes that the acts charged were committed, is too in-
consistent. "176 The court noted, however, that two exceptions to this rule were
carved out by Sears and Henderson.'" To determine the scope of these excep-
tions, the court quoted language from Henderson and Sears that indicated that
the decisions in those cases were dictated by two concerns: (1) the ascertain-
ment of truth and (2) a judgment that reliance on entrapment would not be too
inconsistent with the defendant's other defenses. "s
The Greenfield court then applied those policy concerns to the case at bar.
The Greenfield court emphasized the uniqueness of the facts in the case.'" The
court observed that the defendant admitted to the physical acts alleged to con-
stitute the crime and that the only issue was the defendant's intent.'" The
court held that the defendant may deny this mental element by claiming that he
wrote the prescriptions thinking there to be a legitimate medical purpose while
arguing in the alternative that "to the extent that he may have prescribed
without a legitimate medical purpose, he was not predisposed to do so" and,
therefore, was entrapped.' 81
Because no subsequent court has based a decision on Greenfield, its
significance is not yet known.'" By emphasizing the specific facts in Greenfield,
' 7 " Id. at 181.
17. 4 Id.
1 ' Id. The court limited its holding to the fact that under the circumstances, the alter-
native defenses of entrapment and lack of intent were not so inconsistent as to preclude raising
both of them. Id. at 183. The court, however, left the decision of whether to allow both defenses
at the retrial to the trial court after evaluating the evidence presented there. Id. at 181.
16 Id. at 182. The court then mentioned the criticism in United States v. Demma, 523
F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane). Greenfield, 554 F.2d at 182.
' 77 Id.
Id.
' 79 See id. at 183.
18° Id. at 182-83.
' 51 Id. at 183.
I" A recent Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1980),
cited Greenfield, even though there was insufficient evidence to warrant consideration of the defend-
ant's entrapment defense. Id. at 1303 & n.2. In a footnote, the Hill court commented on the
"disarray" in the circuit's law with respect to the propriety of simultaneous defenses of entrap-
ment and lack of knowledge or intent. Id. at 1303 n.2. The court read the Greenfield case as
"allowing submission of entrapment as [an] alternative to [the] defense of lack of criminal
intent." Id.
Even though the effect of Greenfield may be undetermined, the opinion of two subsequent
Fifth Circuit panels is very definite. In United States v. Daniels, 572 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1978),
the court was able to treat the case at bar under the rule of Sears permitting a defendant to argue
entrapment even though denying the crime because the government's own evidence raised the
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the Fifth Circuit seems to have avoided a general rule that a defendant may
deny any mental element of a crime and still assert entrapment. Whether an
alternative rule may be discerned from Greenfield is not clear. The decision in
Greenfield may rest on a conclusion that the evidence supporting a denial of the
crime' 83 was the same, or virtually the same, evidence that supported entrap-
ment.'" Alternatively, the court may have determined that it was not too in-
consistent to argue that the acts alleged and admitted did not constitute a crime
under the statute involved but that such acts were the result of entrapment. 185
Either of these interpretations would fit under the "testimony not too inconsis-
tent" rule. In fact, the second interpretation was the reasoning used in the two
First Circuit cases of United States v. Caron and United States v. Rodrigues . 1 " Those
cases, in applying the "defendant may not deny" rule, held that it was per-
missible for a defendant to urge entrapment as to the acts charged which he
claims do not constitute a crime.'"
Although the Fifth Circuit cases may seem like an entangled web of con-
fusing precedent, there is a unifying thread. "[S]ince the common goal of all
trials is the ascertainment of truth, inconsistent defenses should be permitted or
not permitted according to whether they might help or hinder the search for
truth. '" 88 Thus, the "testimony not too inconsistent" rule has a defined objec-
tive, the ascertainment of truth.
The "testimony not too inconsistent" rule is superior to both the "defend-
ant must admit all" and "defendant may not deny" rules in advancing an ap-
propriate objective while ensuring that the government prove its case. The
issue of entrapment. Id. at 542. Nonetheless, the court earlier stated that the inconsistency theory
supporting the Fifth Circuit's general position "justifiably has been attacked by this and other
courts." Id. The latest criticism came in the case of United States v. Brooks, 611 F.2d 615 (5th
Cir. 1980). Although entrapment was not an issue on appeal, the court noted that "[t]he con-
tinued cogency of [the Fifth Circuit rule based on the inconsistency theory] has been debated,
. . . but as a panel we are bound by the law of the circuit." Id. at 618. Thus, panels in the Fifth
Circuit may be presaging change in the rule.
185
 Such evidence would be that the government agent led the defendant to believe there
was a legitimate medical purpose for the prescriptions.. .
"4 Such evidence would be that the government agent so importuned the defendant that
the defendant gave the prescriptions when he was not predisposed,
• "5 See United States v. Rodrigues, 433 F.2d 760, 761, (1st Cir. 1970).
It is possible that the Greenfield decision implicitly undermines the Fifth Circuit rule. The
court stated that it does "not believe it is impermissibly inconsistent . . . to argue that to the ex-
tent that the jury may find culpability on [the defendant's] part, he was entrapped." Greenfield,
554 F.2d at 183. Although the Greenfield court was addressing only the question of a mental ele-
ment, the reasoning is similar to that in Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir.
1962) (en banc), where the District of Columbia Circuit validated inconsistent entrapment claims.
See text at notes 85-90 supra.
"6 See United States v. Caron, 588 F.2d 851, 852 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v.
Rodrigues, 433 F.2d 760-61 (1st Cir. 1970). By admitting facts sufficient to maintain his convic-
tion, the defendant is entitled to claim entrapment even if he claims that the acts charged do not
constitute a crime.
1 " Caron, 588 F.2d at 852; Rodrigues, 433 F.2d at 761.
1H8 Sears, 343 F.2d at 143.
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"defendant must admit all" rule provides no rationale as to why a defendant
must admit the crime before he may rely on entrapment, and by requiring a
defendant relying on an entrapment defense to admit all elements of the
substantive crime, that rule relieves the government of its burden of proof. As
for the "defendant may not deny" rule, although it correctly acknowledges the
logical inconsistency of a defendant claiming entrapment as to a crime he has
denied, that rule also may operate to ease the burden of the government
somewhat. The rule forces a defendant wishing to rely on entrapment either to
refrain from taking the stand, thus presumably making the government's case
easier, or to take the stand and, assuming an effective cross examination, admit
the crime. Thus, the "defendant may not deny" rule may provide inadequate
protection for a criminal defendant or hinder the search for truth by preventing
the fact finder from hearing the whole story.
The "testimony not too inconsistent" rule and the "defendant may deny
all" rule are similar in that both rules seek to advance a defined objective in a
logical and effective way. The latter rule, however, in advancing its objective of
providing adequate protection of a criminal defendant ignores the objective of
the former of advancing the search for truth. The "defendant may deny all"
rule, which allows a defendant to claim entrapment as to crimes he has denied,
sanctions a defendant's perjury and obfuscation of truth. Thus, the "testimony
not too inconsistent" rule is the best of the four rules discussed because it pro-
vides the most equitable balance. The rule, however, may not adequately ad-
vance the truth seeking process in one situation. The "testimony not too incon-
sistent" rule would bar a defendant from asserting entrapment where he pro-
vides testimony which acts both to deny the crime and establish entrapment.
Therefore, to rely on entrapment, the defendant would have to forego pro-
viding such testimony. Conversely, to provide that testimony, the defendant
could not rely on entrapment. Thus, the jury would either not have evidence it
should consider or have a viable defense withdrawn from its consideration. In
either event, the truth seeking process would be hindered under the "testimony
not too inconsistent" rule.
II. A PROPOSAL: PRESENCE OF A SUFFICIENT LOGICAL BASIS FOR THE
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE AS A PREREQUISITE TO THAT DEFENSE
As shown above, each of the four rules discussed presents some problems
in addressing the issue of how the nature of the defendant's testimony must
relate to the crime in order for the defendant to be permitted to argue entrap-
ment. Therefore, this note will propose a rule that addresses the issue more
satisfactorily. Because the "testimony not too inconsistent" rule is the most
preferable of the four rules discussed, the proposed rule is a refinement of that
rule. The proposed rule would extend the Fifth Circuit approach by incor-
porating a general rule that a defendant may deny a mental element of a crime
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and still assert entrapment. 189 The rationale of the rule is that a defendant is
entitled to raise the entrapment defense provided that the trial record supplies a
sufficient logical basis for it. This basis may exist in three situations: (1) where
the defendant has admitted the crime or merely refrained from denying the
crime, (2) where the defendant does not deny the requisite physical acts but
does deny a mental element of the crime charged, (3) where the defendant has
denied the physical acts but the government's case has introduced substantial
evidence of entrapment. The proposed modification covers all three of these
situations.
The proposed rule would incorporate the concept of permitting a defend-
ant to argue entrapment provided he does not deny the physical acts and in
spite of his denial of any mental element. In addition, the proposed rule adopts
the holding in Sears' 90 that the defendant is entitled to assert entrapment
whenever the government's case introduces substantial evidence of entrap-
ment.
The proposed rule reconciles several important concerns. First, the defend-
ant is never required to admit any crime. Thus, any fifth amendment question
'" In fact, two Sixth Circuit cases may already support a rule allowing a defendant de-
nying a mental element to claim entrapment. Scriber v. United States, 4 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1925),
an early Sixth Circuit case, suggests this position in dicta. The Scriber case involved a defendant
charged with accepting a bribe to permit illegal liquor importation. Id. at 97. The defendant was
arrested after accepting money, but before the importation occurred. Id. In defense, he claimed
that he intended to seize the liquor and have those who offered the bribe prosecuted. Id. at 97-98.
The trial court refused to instruct the jury on entrapment believing that entrapment would be in-
consistent with this defense. Id. at 98. Although the Sixth Circuit need not have considered the
issue because of the defendant's predisposition, id., it disagreed. "In a proper case, it would
seem that defendant should have the benefit of this defense, even though such inconsistency ex-
ists." Id.
The question of denying a mental element arose again in the Sixth Circuit in the case of
United States v. Baker, 373 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1967). In Baker, the defendant admitted giving a
box containing some pills to a government agent, but sought to interpose two defenses: 1) that he
did not know the pills were morphine, and 2) that the agent entrapped him. Id. at 29. The court
held that it did "not think that in this Circuit the arguable inconsistency between defendant's
first and second defenses at trial rules out submission of both to the jury," id. at 30, and reversed
for a new trial, id. at 31.
The Sixth Circuit case of United States v. Shameia, 464 F.2d 629 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1076 (1972), did not find Baker controlling. Id. at 630. In Shameia, the defendant denied
any transaction with the government agents and denied ever having participated in any similar
illegal transactions. Id. at 629-30. The Sharneia court distinguished Baker since in Baker the defend-
ant had admitted delivering the box containing morphine, whereas Shameia denied all. Id, at
630-31. The court held "that the defendant may not absolutely deny every act necessary to con-
stitute the offense and then claim entrapment on the part of the Government agents." Id. at 631.
The subsequent Sixth Circuit case of United States v. Mitchell, 514 F.2d 758 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975), presents substantial analytical problems. In Mitchell, the defend-
ant was convicted of endeavoring to impede a witness from testifying. Id. at 760. The evidence
indicated that the defendant had discussed killing the witness with a co-indictee and that the co-
indictee, by then a government informer, paid the defendant money to locate the witness. Id.
The decision in Mitchell is unclear, but the defendant apparently denied the motive required for
the crime. Id. at 760-61. The court held that "[u]nder these circumstances the district judge prop-
erly precluded [defendant] from relying on the defense of entrapment." Id. at 761. The Mitchell
decision, however, virtually ignores Sixth Circuit precedent.
190
 343 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir. 1965).
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of forcing a defendant to incriminate himself before he may invoke an existing
valid defense is avoided and the guarantee that the government must prove all
elements of a charged crime is maintained. Second, the truth seeking process is
advanced because the defendant may not deny the physical acts into which he
seeks to claim he was entrapped. To allow the defendant to deny such acts
would provide him with an unwarranted opportunity to confuse the jury. A
defendant cannot be telling the truth if he says that he was entrapped into com-
mitting acts that he claims he did not commit. A criminal defendant should not
have a license to lie. Recent Supreme Court cases have emphasized the truth
seeking nature of criminal trials and have stressed that a trial should not con-
done even a defendant's untruth.' 91
Finally, a rule permitting a defendant wishing to argue entrapment to
deny any mental element will also aid in the truth seeking process. As in the
case of Greenfield,'" there may be situations where evidence that appears to be a
denial of the requisite mental state may well be evidence of entrapment. 193 In
such cases, the defendant should be allowed to assert both defenses. A defend-
ant should not be required to discern where one defense ends and the other
begins. Indeed, the rule of Henderson,'" that a defendant may claim entrap-
ment as to overt acts and deny the existence of any conspiracy, can be thought
of as an example of the proposed rule. 195
In discussing the availability of the entrapment defense, courts have noted
that in some cases the record will not contain enough evidence indicating en-
trapment to warrant submission of that issue to the jury without the testimony
of the defendant. 196 In such a situation, no matter which of the rules discussed
in this note is employed, a defendant must testify to introduce some modicum
of evidence of entrapment as a prerequisite to relying on the entrapment
defense. By testifying, the defendant opens himself to the rigors of cross ex-
amination and impeachment. In this situation, the implementation of the rules
19 ' See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1971) (illegally obtained confes-
sion, inadmissible in the government's case in chief, is permitted to impeach the defendant;
privilege to testify does not include right to commit perjury); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
82-83 (1970) (defendant may be required to give notice of alibi defense and disclose his alibi
witnesses; such a requirement enhances the search for truth); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S.
62, 65 (1954) (impeachment use of illegally obtained real evidence is permissible; the defendant
may not resort to perjurious testimony).
192 554 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978). See text at notes
171-75 supra.
"' Consider, for example, possession of drugs with intent to distribute, or a defendant
who alleges that he believed that he was arranging importation of illegal drugs to aid a govern-
ment investigation. In both of these situations, an entrapment defense may be furthered by the
denial of a mental element.
"4 237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956). See text at notes 138-41 supra.
' 9 ' Whether someone has engaged in a conspiracy or merely has discussed a subject may
well be a situation where a claim of entrapment and a denial of the crime merge. A defendant
may claim that he never intended to carry out any of the acts discussed and that he never would
have discussed them if not for the importuning of the government agent.
199 See, e.g., United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane);
United States v. Worth, 505 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975).
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discussed differs only in respect to what the defendant must admit in order to
be permitted to argue entrapment. Assuming that the defendant's testimony
provides sufficient evidence of entrapment and that the government pursues
vigorous-cross examination, the rules discussed have the following impact on
the defendant's testimony. Under the "defendant must admit all" rule, the
defendant must, of course, admit every element of the crime. The "defendant
may deny all" rule leaves the defendant free to testify as he wishes. The
"defendant may not deny" and "testimony not too inconsistent" rules would
require the defendant to admit to the crime. Under the proposed rule,
however, the defendant is required to admit only the physical acts of the crime.
This result of the proposed rule is proper. Because it is assumed that the
prosecution will vigorously cross examine the defendant, a defendant who does
not admit the physical acts must deny them. Where, aside from the defendant's
testimony, there is insufficient evidence of entrapment, a defendant who has
denied the physical acts has undermined the only logical basis for an entrap-
ment defense. Under such circumstances, permitting the defendant to argue
entrapment would serve to condone the defendant's perjury and confuse the
jury. In situations where the government's case provides significant evidence of
entrapment so as to warrant the jury considering the issue, a defendant's
denial will not remove the logical basis of the entrapment defense established
by the government's case. Thus, a rule that would allow a defendant to argue
entrapment only where he refrains from denying any physical act of the charged
crime or where the government's own case introduces substantial evidence of
entrapment is preferable to other rules adopted by the federal courts.
CONCLUSION
The approaches of the circuits in determining whether a defendant's
testimony can preclude the assertion of an entrapment defense may be divided
into four positions: One position requires the defendant to admit to the crime
before he may assert entrapment with regard -to that crime. Another approach
allows the entrapment defense to a defendant who refrains from denying the
crime. A third position is that the defendant's testimony cannot preclude the
defense; he may deny all. The final approach is that of the Fifth Circuit which
allows a defendant to urge entrapment provided that his testimony is not too
inconsistent with that defense. None of these approaches, however, draws the
appropriate balance between the concerns in a trial.
The rule proposed in this note extends the Fifth Circuit approach to allow
a defendant to deny any mental element required for the crime charged while
preserving his ability to claim entrapment. The proposed rule retains the Fifth
Circuit's prohibition of an entrapment defense to a defendant who denies any
physical acts of the charged crime, as well as that circuit's principle that the en-
trapment defense is available where the government's case introduces the ele-
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ment of entrapment. The proposed rule answers many of the criticisms leveled
at the circuits' various positions, provides a logical and reasoned approach,
and should be adopted.
THOMAS J. RAUBACH
